INTRODUCTION
O ver the last decade almost every state government in the United States has embraced standards-based reforms as a strategy to improve the quality of public education. Although there is enormous variation among states in the design of their reform plans, all plans include four components:
(1) curriculum frameworks-a statement of the skills students should master in each core subject at each grade level (2) assessments which provide information about the extent to which students have met standards (3) stakes for students or for teachers (4) efforts to increase the capacity of schools to help children meet the standards.
Standards-based reforms mark a significant departure from previous attempts by state governments to improve public education-a shift from a focus on inputs to a focus on outputs. In the past state education policies focused on providing funds to local districts to pay for inputs. Sometimes, strings were attached-for example, requiring that districts employ only teachers who met state licensing standards. However, districts were left to decide what "outputs" their schools should try to produce-what children should learn, how learning should be assessed, and what the consequences were for promotion or graduation when children did not learn.
Under standards-based educational reforms schools are to be accountable for the performance of their students. In principle, they are to have the resources to meet the new challenge and the freedom to decide how to use their resources to best increase student achievement.
Current versions of standards-based reforms will have their greatest impact on children at the bottom of the achievement distribution. They are the children most at risk of not meeting the new standards and of not passing the exit examinations that most states are making a condition for obtaining a high school diploma.
The bottom of the achievement distribution contains disproportionate numbers of children of color. We include in this category black, Hispanic, and Native-American children, as well as large numbers of immigrant children from Vietnam, Cambodia, and other low-income countries. Children of color are the majority in a growing number of the nation's largest urban school districts and will be the majority of the nation's public school student population in the year 2040 (Olson, 1999) . For these reasons we focus this paper on the impacts standards-based educational reforms have on students of color, recognizing that this term is a place-holder for a much larger group of children who have not fared well in American public schools.
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Advocates for children are well aware of the stakes that standards-based reforms pose for children of color. However, they vary in their reactions. Some embrace standards-based educational reforms. For example, the civil rights lawyer, William Taylor, writes:
Today, new forms of accountability and assessment are the best tools we have to ensure quality education for all children. When schools and districts are held accountable for the achievement of all students, the means are at hand to force them to improve the quality of schooling provided for previously neglected students. Standards and accountability expose the sham that passes for education in many heavily minority schools and provide measurements and pressure to prod schools to target resources where they are needed most (Taylor, 2000) .
In a similar vein, the Education Trust, an organization dedicated to closing the achievement gaps that separate poor and minority students from their more advantaged peers, 2 endorses educational standards:
In fact, the evidence seems to argue that, rather than being harmed by higher standards, poor and minority youngsters have the most to gain, for the simple reason that they are the biggest victims of our current system of different, and lower, standards for some students (Education Trust, 1998) .
Other advocates for children have a very different view of the standards movement. For example, Alfie Kohn, writes:
. . . when someone emphasizes the importance of "higher expectations" for minority children, we might reply, "Higher expectations to do what? Bubble-in more ovals correctly on a bad test-or pursue engaging projects that promote sophisticated thinking?" The movement driven by "tougher standards," "accountability," and similar slogans arguably lowers meaningful expectations insofar as it relies on standardized testing as the primary measure of achievement. The more that poor children fill in worksheets on command (in an effort to raise their test scores), the further they fall behind affluent kids who are more likely to get lessons that help them understand ideas. If the drilling does result in higher scores, the proper response is not celebration, but outrage: The test results may well have improved at the expense of real learning. (Kohn, 2000) Debbie Meier, a pioneering educator with a long track record of developing high performance schools serving primarily students of color, predicts the following consequences of the standards-based educational reform strategy:
1 In recent years, test scores for minority students and white students have converged modestly. Convergence in test scores has not translated into more equal earnings because the economy increasingly values skills. Consequently, a test score gap of a given size involves a greater dollar cost today than was the case in the past (Murnane, Willett and Levy, 1995; Neal and Johnson, 1996 ). An implication is that improving the quality of education students of color receive is critical to improving their subsequent economic well-being. 2 See http://www.edtrust.org/main/index.asp.
It will not help to develop young minds, contribute to a more robust democratic life, or aid the most vulnerable of our fellow citizens. By shifting the locus of authority to outside bodies, it undermines the capacity of schools to instruct by example in the qualities of mind that schools in a democracy should be fostering in kids -responsibility for one's own ideas, tolerance for the ideas of others, and a capacity to negotiate differences (Meier, 2000, pp. 4-5) .
This disagreement begins with different expectations about resources and incentives. While advocates for children agree that testing alone accomplishes nothing beneficial, 3 those who support standards-based reforms believe they will result in a combination of increased resources and better incentives that will improve education for urban children. Those who decry the standards movement believe that standards-based reforms will not result in adequate resources for urban schools. Moreover, they argue that the incentives embedded in standards-based reforms will lead to dysfunctional responses that reduce the quality of education children of color receive.
The disagreement about standards' effects on children of color reflects differing perceptions of the pre-standards status quo as well as differing predictions about the consequences of standardsbased reforms. Opponents of standardsbased reforms point out that the majority of students of color currently earn high school diplomas, which enable them to earn more than school dropouts. They fear that significant numbers of minority students will fail high school exit examinations and so enter the labor market without a diploma. Proponents of standards believe the damage already occurs-employers learn which high school graduates lack basic skills-and standards will shine a light on the problem while these children are still in school.
Given the wide variation among states in the design of their standards-based educational reforms, both those who support the standards movement and those who attack it find evidence to support their predictions. The current situation is further muddled because even the evidence from individual states is far from clear. We illustrate this by reviewing some of the differing interpretations of the consequences of Texas school reforms.
As the Texas story illustrates, standardsbased reforms are a work in progress with possibilities for both harm and good and much uncertainty about what causes either outcome. Despite this uncertainty, findings have emerged that can serve as a guide for designing standards-based accountability systems that hold the greatest potential for improving educational outcomes for children of color. Some of the findings come from experience with standards per se. Others come from recent literatures on improving organizational performance through incentives and capacity building-two critical elements of standards-based educational reforms.
STANDARDS-BASED EDUCATIONAL REFORM IN TEXAS
In most states standards-based educational reforms are altering the landscape of public education.
States are specifying what children should learn at each grade level. They are testing whether students meet standards. They are beginning to impose sanctions on students who do not meet standards or on their teachers.
Are the standards-based reforms resulting in better education for children of color? Undoubtedly the answer varies among states since the details of reform plans differ enormously. However, there is even a lack of clarity about the progress individual states have made. We illustrate this by describing differing interpretations of the evidence on how standards-based reforms in Texas have affected the quality of education provided to children of color.
In 1984 a group of Texas business leaders, headed by H.Ross Perot, pushed an educational reform bill through the Texas legislature that not only provided more state funding to low spending districts, but also put in place a plan to develop "new learning standards for each grade, measuring learning by aligning state wide assessment to those standards, holding schools accountable to results, . . . " Flanagan, 1998, p.28 as quoted in Carnoy, Loeb, and Smith, 2001 ). The primary measure of student achievement is the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS). TAAS tests of basic reading and math skills are administered in grades 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 10 . Recently a TAAS writing test was introduced in grades 4, 8, and 10.
The 1990-91 school year marked the first year that passing the tenth grade TAAS was a requirement for high school graduation. TAAS scores not only affect students; they also affect those who teach them. The state rates the performance of every public school on the basis of its students' scores on the TAAS as well as on other performance indicators, such as attendance rates. The performance rating is determined not only by the TAAS average score, but by the percentage of students of each racial/ethnic group who achieve passing scores. Schools rated as Exemplary, Recognized, or Acceptable are eligible to compete for awards ranging from $500 to $5,000 per school under the Texas Successful Schools Award System. 4 The worst performing schools are rated Low Performing and are subject to sanctions.
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According to data available on the Texas Education Agency (TEA) website, standards-based educational reforms in Texas have been a remarkable success. The percentage of students of every racial/ethnic group who achieved at least minimal passing scores on the TAAS increased steadily at every grade level. The gap between the average performance of white students and those of black and Hispanic students on the TAAS closed. School dropout rates for every racial/ethnic group declined.
6 Not all analysts who have examined the evidence on Texas school reform share the TEA's interpretation. What is perhaps more interesting, however, are the differences in interpretations among independent analysts. Boston College psychometrician Walt Haney argues that a major consequence of the Texas school accountability system has been an increase in ninth grade retention rates for students of color. In his words, . . . since 1992 progress from grade 9 to high school graduation has been stymied for Black and Hispanic students not after grade 10 when they first take the TAAS exit test, but in grade nine before they take the TAAS exit test. These results clearly suggest the possibility that after 1990 schools in Texas have increasingly been retaining students, disproportionately Black and Hispanic students, in grade nine in order to make their grade 10 TAAS scores look better (Haney, 2001, p.10) .
A group of Stanford scholars headed by economist Martin Carnoy also looked at trends in ninth grade retention in Texas. Like Haney, they found significant increases in retention rates for black and Latino students. However, they do not see the TAAS as the cause:
There is no doubt that retention rates for minority students have risen greatly during the reform period and have only tailed off in the past three to four years. However, there is no compelling evidence that the implementation of the tenth grade TAAS in 1990-91 was responsible for rising retention rates. Increasing standards and assessment, which began in 1984 in Texas, are associated with increased retention, particularly of blacks and Latinos, but this increase does not appear to be linked specifically with the introduction of the tenth grade TAAS. Other analysts have raised questions about test score gains. (Carnoy, Loeb and Smith, 2001, pp. 10-11) .
The dispute between Haney and the Stanford group illustrates how difficult it is to pin down what elements of a particular accountability system lead to particular outcomes. While Haney emphasizes the impact of the TAAS exit exam, passage of which became a requirement for graduation in the 1992-93 school year, a close reading of his work shows that he is aware that the increase in ninth grade retention rates began a decade earlier. He points out that this is consistent with his emphasis on the negative consequences of high stakes testing because the TAAS was preceded by another, albeit less demanding, exit examination (The Texas Educational Assessment of Minimum Skills (TEAMS)) (Haney, 2000) .
The Stanford group downplays the role of high stakes testing. It points out that Texas school reform has had several components, including increased academic requirements introduced initially in 1984 and increased further in the early 1990s. One of these requirements is that students must pass three years of mathematics to obtain a high school diploma. Since 1995 Algebra I is the lowest level mathematics course that the state counts toward the three-course mathematics requirement.
To summarize, Haney and the Stanford group agree that ninth grade retention rates of students of color have increased dramatically in Texas since the mid-1980s. While the two groups favor different explanations, they would probably agree that the complexity of the Texas accountability systems and the many design changes that have been introduced since its inception in 1984 make it impossible to determine unequivocally the relative importance of changing exit exam requirements and course completion requirements in causing the increase in retention rates.
Other analysts have focused on the meaning of the TAAS test score trends. A group of researchers at the Rand Corporation headed by Stephen Klein compared TAAS test score trends with trends in the scores of Texas students on the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP). They found:
Texas students did improve significantly more on a fourth-grade NAEP math test than their counterparts nationally. But, the size of this gain was smaller than their gains on TAAS and was not present on the eighth-grade math test. The stark differences between the stories told by NAEP and TAAS are especially striking when it comes to the gap in average scores between whites and students of color. According to the NAEP results, that gap in Texas is not only very large but increasing slightly. According to TAAS scores, the gap is much smaller and decreasing greatly (Klein et. al., 2000 , page 1).
Another Rand research group headed by David Grissmer reached a somewhat different conclusion about trends in the performance of Texas students on the NAEP. This group found that after accounting for differences in the socioeconomic characteristics of students, the highest rates of improvement in NAEP fourth grade reading and math scores occurred in Texas and North Carolina. This group also compared NAEP and TAAS score trends, but reached a different conclusion from Klein's group:
Texas and North Carolina-the states showing the highest rate of improvement [on the NAEP]-were the subject of a case study to determine whether their stateadministered test scores showed similar gains and to try to identify plausible reasons for such large gains. . . . The stateadministered tests given to all students statewide showed similarly large gains in math scores in both states, providing an independent verification of the NAEP trends (Grissmer et. al., 2000, p. 59) .
It is possible to reconcile, to some extent, the differences between the Grissmer group's interpretation of the Texas test score evidence and the Klein group's interpretation. The studies had different goals and very different designs. Grissmer's group focused on studying the extent to which differences across states in NAEP test score trends could be explained by different patterns of resource use. His group compared NAEP score trends with TAAS trends to support the validity of the NAEP score trends. Klein's group focused on examining the validity of the TAAS score trends. They used the comparison with NAEP score trends to argue that the TAAS score trends were misleading.
Nonetheless, the studies do suggest quite different messages about changes over the last decade in Texas in the achievement gap between children of color and white children. The Grissmer group sees the gap as closing. The Klein group does not. The release of the 2000 NAEP math scores should help in resolving this disagreement.
7 However, the new data will not clarify the extent to which changes in the size of the achievement gap stem from particular elements of the evolving Texas accountability system or from changes in resource levels and resource uses.
The five different interpretations of one state's data underline the difficulty in evaluating the consequences for children of color of a particular standards-based reform effort. The variation in reform designs across states and the evolving nature of many states' designs only increases this uncertainty. Nonetheless, important principles have emerged about what it takes to make standards-based reforms result in better education for children of color. We describe these principles briefly and explain how they bear on the design of standards-based educational reforms. We show that each principle highlights new challenges in making standards-based reforms work for children of color.
INCENTIVES, RESOURCES, CAPACITY, AND STANDARDS-BASED REFORMS
Seen through the lens of economic and organizational theory, designing educational standards is a problem in incentive design and capacity building. We begin with incentives.
Creating incentives that lead to the efficient use of scarce resources lies at the core of economics. Every microeconomics text provides numerous examples of inefficiencies resulting from a lack of incentives or from inappropriate incentives. But what does it take to get the incentives right? In the last 40 years contributions to the "principal-agent" literature in economics and the business management literature have provided insights about the answers that are relevant to the challenge of making standards-based reforms work for children of color. 7 We thank Martin Carnoy for pointing out to us the importance of the year 2000 NAEP math test score results for understanding how the achievement gap between children of color and white children has changed in Texas.
What to Test?
The principal-agent literature in economics is concerned with the design of incentives that will induce self-interested economic agents to behave in a manner that promotes the goals of the "principal." This literature is relevant to the debate about standards-based accountability systems because this debate is very much about getting the incentives right. Several premises underlie the principal-agent literature. To design an incentive system that promotes the goals of an organization, the goals must be clear. If there is more than one goal, the relative importance of each must be well defined. It is critical to measure progress toward goals accurately. As explained in a paper with the wonderful title, "On the Folly of Rewarding A While Hoping for B" (Kerr, 1975 ), significant problems arise when an organization rewards something it can measure (A) that is imperfectly correlated with the outcome it really values, but cannot measure (B).
The translation of these ideas into the classroom begins with the aphorism, "What you test is what you get." Most state policymakers initially defined the goal of standards-based reform as improving education for all children. The process of designing an accountability system made clear the need for a much more precise definition. States have struggled both in defining the critical skills children at each grade level should master and in determining assessment strategies to measure children's skills.
Consider writing as an example. Most state curriculum frameworks include writing as a critical skill and describe the writing skills children should master at certain grade levels. The most straightforward way to assess students' writing skills is to grade writing that students do. However, this is difficult and expensive. It requires agreement on what type of writing to evaluate and what good writing of that type looks like. It also requires training graders to use common standards to evaluating students' writing and paying them to do the time-consuming work of evaluating writing samples.
Some states have undertaken this expensive assessment strategy. They have found that when students' writing skills are a critical part of the state-mandated accountability system, teachers devote more instructional time working with students to improve the quality of their writing-i.e., the schools get what they test.
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These states have also received a less obvious benefit. Teaching is an isolating occupation in which daily routines allow little time for the exchange of ideas and techniques. At a time when schools are searching for ways to improve, the obstacles to sharing knowledge are quite serious. When teachers and administrators meet to grade samples of students' writing, the result is often a healthy debate about the standards students are expected to meet and what exemplary performance looks like. Making graded samples of student writing public often sparks similarly constructive discussions of standards among parents, business leaders, and other taxpayers.
In contrast, other states do not assess students' writing. Instead they have adopted commercial multiple-choice achievement tests that measure students' mastery of vocabulary and grammar. The underlying logic is that knowledge of vocabulary and grammar are necessary to write well and consequently this less expensive assessment strategy is satisfactory. However, it has led teachers to focus instruction on grammar and vocabulary rather than on writing-an example of rewarding A while hoping for B.
Misaligned incentives become a particular problem in high poverty schools.
Many students in these schools are in danger of doing poorly on assessments. Teachers often respond to this problem by letting the skills tested on the assessments become the entire curriculum. If the assessments accurately measure mastery of the skills students will need to thrive in a changing economy and a changing democracy, this focus should improve students' education. However, these are extremely stringent conditions. If they are not met, students of color in high poverty schools are likely to receive a different education than policy makers had intended. 9 An implication is that the accountability system should include high quality assessments of the skills deemed to be critical. Of course, this is easier said than done. For example, speaking articulately and negotiating effectively are increasingly important skills in an economy in which more and more of the routine work is carried out by computers (Murnane and Levy, 1996) . This is a serious problem and we revisit it in the paper's final section.
Whom to Test?
Along with "what you test is what you get," a second principle emerging from initial experience is "Whom you test is who gets taught." Students whose work is part of the accountability system are the students who count. If the scores of children in bilingual education programs and the scores of children designated as learning disabled are not counted, schools have incentives to place into these programs children at risk of scoring poorly on the mandatory assessments. They also have incentives to focus instructional resources on the students whose scores do count. This concern has led many states to mandate that the scores of all students in public schools count in evaluating school performance. This is an important step in making standards-based reforms result in improved education for children of color, who are over-represented in special education programs and bilingual education programs.
Of course, a mandate that all students' scores count leads to practical problems. What accommodations should be made in assessment procedures for children with special needs? What about for children who are in the early stages of learning English? These questions do not have simple answers.
10 It is clear, however, that excluding these children from the accountability system is the wrong answer if the goal is to improve education for children of color. These questions are part of the larger issue of how a schools' progress should be measured.
What Constitutes Progress?
One lesson that states have learned is that the school should be the unit of accountability rather than the individual teacher. This follows from the point made earlier-that teaching is an isolating occupation and rewarding the school creates incentives for teachers to work together to make progress toward shared goals. In addition, evaluations of the performances of individual teachers are more prone to measurement error than evaluations of schools because the larger number of students underlying a school's performance tends to average out random fluctuations (Kane and Staiger, 2001) . Even working at the school level, however, defining progress is no easy thing. It 9 Two recent reports from the Consortium on Chicago School Research show that "drill and kill" is not the only way to prepare urban students to do well on commercial multiple-choice tests. These reports show that students do better on these tests when they are taught by teachers who engage them in deep and broad thinking and who assign challenging intellectual work (Newmann, Bryk, and Nagaoka, 2001; Smith, Lee and Newmann, 2000) . However, as we discuss later in this paper, a great many teachers do not know how to teach in this way. For them, "drill and kill" may be the only viable response to accountability pressure. 10 For a thoughtful discussion of these issues, see McDonnell, McLaughlin, and Morison (1997). has been clear since the publication of the Coleman Report in 1966 that children's family backgrounds are strong predictors of their test scores. As a result, basing evaluations of schools on the average scores of their students unfairly handicaps schools serving large percentages of students from low-income families. This handicap also has a feedback effect since teachers have incentives to avoid schools with consistently low performance ratings. Consequently an accountability system that places schools serving high poverty student populations at a disadvantage reduces the likelihood that standards-based reforms will result in better education for children of color.
States have struggled with alternative ways to measure the contribution of schools to their students' achievement. One strategy is to compare test scores only among schools serving demographically similar student populations. A second is to compare the rates at which average test scores of children in particular grades of a school improve over time. A third is to use longitudinal data on individual students' achievement to estimate "the value-added" of the education provided by individual schools.
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A number of studies demonstrate that small differences in strategies used to measure the contributions of individual schools to student achievement result in significant differences in school rankings (Ladd and Walch, 2001; Lynn and Baker, 1999, p. 17; Kane and Staiger, 2001) . Some studies also show that many methods of evaluating the contributions of individual schools tend to favor schools serving relatively advantaged students (Ladd and Walch, 2001) . Given these patterns, does it make sense for states to use the performance ratings as the basis for substantial financial rewards for the faculties of schools seen as high performing and as the basis for substantial penalties for the faculties of schools seen as low performing?
How Big Should the Stakes Be for Educators?
In the simplest economic models, bigger stakes represent stronger performance incentives. Nonetheless, there are two reasons why standards-based reforms should go slowly in designing stakes for educators.
The first reason is the problem just stated. When problems remain in defining and measuring progress, big stakes risk serious unintended consequences. One of these is putting a school in a position where it is unable to attract quality teachers. As Robert Lynn has shown, this outcome is most likely in schools serving high percentages of students of color (Lynn, 2000) .
The second reason arises in the writing of W. Edwards Deming, the father of quality control, whose work had an extraordinary impact on business management in Japan after World War II and later in the U.S. Deming emphasized the distinction between monitoring production processes and using the information as the basis of sanctions (Deming, 1986) . He was a strong proponent of using statistical methods to learn which production processes were working well and which were not-the industrial equivalent of assessments. But Deming also emphasized the need to examine why individual production processes were not working well and to base responses on an understanding of the source of the problem.
Deming's ideas are directly applicable to the standards debate. Even as we improve our definition of educational progress, it remains less clear what to do with the information. While there is agree-ment that the status quo should not continue in schools in which children are not making substantial progress toward meeting standards, there is growing understanding that the choice of response should depend on the source of the problem. Possibilities include poor leadership, poorly skilled teachers, insufficient resources or inefficient constraints on their use, extraordinarily great student needs, and simply measurement error. Basing the response on an analysis of the reason for a lack of progress is more likely to result in improvement than automatic sanctions not tailored to the source of the low achievement.
In practice, it may not be possible to precisely determine the sources of failure. In that case, recent contributions to organizational design provide insights about what to do. In situations in which it is not possible to measure accurately the contributions of individual agents to an organization's goals, strong incentives may be ill-advised. Instead it may be more efficient to couple weak incentives with job designs that attract talented workers and encourage cooperation (Gibbons, 1998; Nadler and Tushman, 1997) . This message is consistent with Kentucky's decision to move away from significant rewards that teachers in a school can divide among themselves to more modest rewards that must be used to improve a school's instructional program (Kelley, Conley and Kimball, 2000) .
The Right Incentives for Students?
To this point, we have focused on incentives for schools and teachers. As John Bishop has emphasized, one of the benefits of standards-based educational reforms is improving incentives for students to devote greater attention to school work (Bishop et. al., 2001) . Will the requirement that high school students pass a rigorous exit exam lead them to devote more time and attention to school work? The answer is likely to depend both on perceptions of the subsequent economic payoff to passing the exit exam and on perceptions of whether greater attention to school work will markedly increase the probability of passing the exit exam.
A number of economists have argued that high school graduates will benefit economically from standards-based reforms if employers find that high school graduates who pass an exit examination are more productive employees than high school graduates had been before the introduction of an exit examination (Betts and Costrell, 2001; Bishop et. al., 2001) . This is more likely to be the case if the exit exam measures the types of skills that are important in an economy in which computers are doing an increasing amount of the routine work. Such skills include the ability to formulate and solve non-routine problems and the ability to communicate well, both orally and in writing.
The difficulty this poses for many students, especially students of color attending urban schools, is that they have not received the high quality instruction required to pass a demanding exit examination assessing problem-solving skills and communication skills. If students do not perceive that attention to the school work they are asked to do develops the skills they need to pass the exit examination, they are unlikely to stick to the school work.
One short-term solution that some states have chosen is to make the exit examination an assessment of very basic cognitive skills. Since a focus on drill will produce score increases on such tests, paying attention to school work will increase the likelihood that students pass the exit exam. However, this is only a short-term fix in a changing economy that increasingly values problem-solving and communication skills. Students who lack these skills are unlikely to fare well in the labor market. Once students become aware of this, the incentive to focus on school work diminishes. Thus, a real solution requires that all students receive the high quality instruction needed to master critical skills.
Adequate Resources and Capacity Building
While we speak of "incentives" and capacity building as separate ideas, they are in reality closely linked. Among the definitions of the word "incentive" in the Oxford Universal Dictionary is "something that incites to action." While traditionally economists defined incentives in terms of financial rewards and penalties, they have come to appreciate the need for a broader definition. For example, creating work environments that attract talented workers and provide opportunities for them to excel may promote the goals of an organization better than significant financial rewards for individual contributions (Nadler and Tushman, 1997) .
When educational standards make the school the unit of accountability, two propositions follow: schools should have adequate resources for their job, and administrators and teachers in individual schools should decide who their colleagues will be and how the resources will be used.
In practice, both propositions have proven difficult to achieve. In many districts collectively bargained teacher contract provisions that antedate standardsbased reforms restrict the freedom of individual faculties to recruit the strongest candidate for an open teaching position. In few districts do administrators and teachers in individual schools have control over substantial resources. As a result, many administrators and teachers argue that standards-based reforms make them accountable for students' achievement but do not provide control of the resources needed to do the job. In these circumstances teachers have incentives to avoid positions in schools serving large percentages of students of color who will not score well on mandatory tests unless they receive consistently high quality instruction.
The problem of staffing schools serving poor children with skilled teachers is not new. In 1952 the sociologist Howard Becker described how Chicago teachers tend to start their careers in schools serving poor children but move quickly to schools serving middle-class children (Becker, 1952) . This pattern left many central city schools with a succession of beginning teachers. Many subsequent studies have documented the same pattern. Opponents of standards-based reforms see this accountability approach as exacerbating the problem by shining light on the deficiencies of many urban schools without providing sufficient resources to correct the deficiencies.
What will it take to attract well educated college graduates to urban districts where teaching conditions have historically been difficult? Pay competitive with alternative opportunities is part of the answer. Another part is creating working conditions in which teachers can succeed in helping children to meet high achievement standards. The test of whether urban schools have "gotten the incentives right" is that they have been able to reverse the teacher mobility pattern that Becker described almost fifty years ago. This is a necessary condition for standards-based reforms to improve educational outcomes for children of color.
To compete effectively for teaching talent, many urban school districts will need more money from state governments than they currently receive. Reasons include the relatively high cost of living in cities, the high cost of maintaining an aging stock of schools, the need to replace this stock, and the need to provide urban teachers with the tools to educate well the large number of urban children who come to school with disabilities. Few state aid systems provide urban school districts with the resources needed to attract and retain a talented teaching force. Nor do most cities possess the fiscal capacity to fund public schools adequately from local taxes. This problem lies at the root of many recent court challenges to state systems of school financing.
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The second part of capacity building is increasing the skills of teachers on the job. This is critical because strong incentives for agents to do something that they do not know how to do are likely to lead to dysfunctional responses. Hence, creating the knowledge and skills necessary to improve performance is a critical complement to getting the incentives right.
Is it possible to provide consistently high quality instruction in urban schools serving predominantly children of color from low-income families? There is no question that this is possible in individual schools. Both the Education Trust and the Heritage Foundation-organizations with very different agendas-have published studies identifying high performing, high poverty urban schools.
13 However, as Richard Elmore has explained, it has proven extraordinarily difficult to "go to scale" -that is, to replicate successes and move, for example, from a few high performing schools to a high performing school district. One obstacle is the mindset that good teachers are born, not made, and consequently systematic investment in developing teachers' skills is not part of the culture. A second obstacle is an organizational structure that hinders sustained learning by adults. A third is a lack of incentives for teachers to engage in the labor-intensive, risk-laden work of changing how they work with students and with each other (Elmore, 1996) .
There are many initiatives in the United States that seek to overcome these obstacles and to provide teachers in schools serving children of color with intensive professional development focused on helping all children to master demanding standards. These include the Institute for Learning centered at the University of Pittsburgh and the Boston Plan for Excellence. These initiatives are promising. Their focused, sustained approach is consistent with, and indeed is more intensive than, professional development in California that resulted in student achievement gains (Cohen and Hill, 2000) . To date, however, there has been no rigorous evaluation of whether these initiatives do result in marked improvement in students' skills and a closing of the achievement gap between white students and students of color. Conducting such evaluations is critical because the argument that standards-based educational reforms will benefit children of color rests on the premise that these reforms will result in the consistently good teaching required to close the achievement gap between white children and children of color.
SUMMING UP
One lesson from the first decade of standards-based educational reforms in the United States is that closing the achievement gap between white children and children of color is much more difficult than many policymakers anticipated. Of course, the stability of the gap is no surprise to historians who can recount its long genesis and troubling roots or to scholars of organizations who understand the many factors hindering improvements in urban school systems.
In contrast, a decade is a long time for elected officials who must defend the considerable amount of money many states have invested in standards-based educational reforms. Some are questioning whether standards-based educational reforms should continue to have priority in their state government's budget. If the 12 The report of a recent National Research Council Committee summarizes the challenges in financing public schools in the United States (Ladd and Hansen, 1999) . 13 See (Education Trust, 1999) and (Carter, 2000) . economy slows markedly, many more will ask this question.
While achievement gains have been slow in coming, states are making progress. As described in Quality Counts: A Better Balance (Education Week, 2001) , standards are becoming more clear; assessments are improving; professional development is becoming more focused.
The ideas reported in this paper give a sense of the guidelines within which future development should proceed. Three messages stand out. The first is the need for patience: there is no room for big stakes until assessments have been properly aligned with desired skills and states have developed good measures of progress. The second message is that standardsbased reform is a compact: schools are now accountable for student performance but in exchange, schools must receive the resources and administrative authority to do their job. Without, for example, the ability to attract high quality teachers, making a school accountable is a recipe for further failure.
The third message that emerges from recent experience is the need to see assessments in broader terms. Earlier, we noted that the economy increasingly requires workers to speak effectively and negotiate with others in team situations. While some school faculties do assess students' skills in these areas, they do so using individualized assessments that do not lend themselves to standardization (DarlingHammond and Ancess, 1994 ). An implication is that the accountability system most effective in promoting development of critical skills may be a mixed system, combining statewide mandatory assessments of some skills such as writing and mathematical problem solving with a process of approving assessments of skills such as speaking and negotiating that are designed by individual schools or districts.
A mixed system creates new challenges. Procedures must be established for approving school-or district-specific assessments. Decisions must be made about the relative weights given to state-wide assessments versus school-or districtspecific assessments in determining graduation criteria. Such a mixed system would inevitably be complex and messy. However, from the perspective of improving education for children of color, a mixed system may have two overriding advantages. First, by requiring schools to develop and implement methods of assessing students' communications skills, it may create incentives for schools to devote attention to these critical skills. Second, it may encourage the development of innovative urban schools such as those Debbie Meier has established.
Will states retain their commitments to standards-based educational reforms, make significant mid-course adjustments to implement lessons from the first decade, and provide the money needed to make the reforms work for children of color? Based on past track records, the prediction would have to be no. Historically, priorities for American schools have tended to change frequently, due in part to the need for newly elected public officials to develop their own educational agendas. As urban public schools increasingly serve only children of color, their ability to command resources declines.
On the other hand, one can make the case that standards-based reforms are different in important respects from earlier efforts to improve American schools. There is increasingly widespread understanding that the quality of education children receive will determine their economic success more than in the past and that the gap between the earnings of white Americans and those of Americans of color will not close unless the academic achievement gap closes. Standards-based educational reforms have substantial support from American business and from a broad cross-section of the nation's governors from both political parties. They also have the support of many advocates for the disadvantaged.
Only time will tell whether standardsbased reforms result in better education for children of color. The stakes are high in a country in which within forty years the majority of the nation's public school students will be children of color.
